

The Spectre of Illicit Financial Flows: Undermining Justice

A Primer on the opacity in the global financial system and
challenges for developing countries

(Draft for Comments)



This document is for private circulation and is not a priced publication. Reproduction of this publication for educational and other non-commercial purposes without prior written permission is authorised, provided the source is fully acknowledged.

Photo Image Credit: African Outlook Online

©2017 Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (CBGA)

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial License (CC BY-NC 4.0).

Author

Sakshi Rai

For more information, kindly contact sakshi@cbgaindia.org

Inputs provided by

Dr Matti Kohonen, Neeti Biyani

Designed by

Common Sans, 1729, Sector 31, Gurgaon, Haryana

Published by

Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (CBGA) in support with Financial Transparency Coalition (FTC).

B-7 Extn./110A (Ground Floor), Harsukh Marg, Safdarjung Enclave,
New Delhi-110029

Phone: +91-11-49200400/ 401/ 402

Email: info@cbgaindia.org

Website: www.cbgaindia.org

Views expressed in this document do not necessarily represent the positions of CBGA or FTC.



Contents

What are Illicit Financial Flows?

1. How Do Countries Lose Money Globally?
 - 1.1 Enablers, Components, Methods & Practices
2. How do International Institutions View Illicit Financial Flows?
3. How Do Illicit Financial Flows Undermine Justice in Developing Countries?
 - 3.1 The Role of State and Institutions in the Global South
 - 3.2 The Hegemony of Secrecy Jurisdictions: Where does the Money End Up?
4. Restoring Justice: Putting an End to Illicit Financial Flows

Bibliography

Glossary

AAAA	Addis Ababa Action Agenda
AML	Anti-Money Laundering
CIT	Corporate Income Tax
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPZ	Export Processing Zones
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTZ	Free Trade Zone
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HNWI	High Net-Worth Individuals
IFF	Illicit Financial Flows
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MNC	Multi- National Companies
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFC	Offshore Financial Centre
PEP	Politically Exposed Person
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIC	Small Island Country
UBO	Ultimate Beneficial Owner
UNODC	United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime

What are Illicit Financial Flows?

1. How Do Countries Lose Money Globally?

Cross-border loss of revenue in countries is commonly associated with capital flight. However, massive cross-border revenue losses in countries occur as illicit financial flows (IFFs). The most widely accepted definition of illicit financial flows is the illegal movement of funds or capital from one country to another. These funds may be earned, transferred and/ or used from the proceeds of crime and corruption, or activities like money laundering, trade based manipulation and tax dodging practices used by multinational corporations (MNCs) or the rich. On the other hand, capital flight is essentially an unreported and undocumented outflow or transfer of asset to another jurisdiction in order to minimise the “loss of principal, loss of return or loss of control”¹ of finances acquired both illegally and illicitly. Evidently, the rate of return on unreported capital to the domicile country will be low. All capital flight is essentially illegal but not all of it classifies as IFFs.

IFFs are synonymously referred to as grey money and black or dirty money. Grey money however, mostly implies towards money generated from tax evasion related activities and black or dirty money denotes money generated from criminal proceeds. Both terms convey a sense of ‘illegality’ either in the origin of the revenue or the act itself. Historically, laundering of illegal capital from proceeds of crime, terrorist financing, corruption and tax evasion have received a greater focus. In this context, capital flight arising from illegal sources or moved through illegal channels is a component of IFFs. Further, tax avoidance is an example of IFFs irrespective of the source of the capital; therefore IFFs put forward a wider mandate.

The focus on the term ‘illicit’ in IFFs should be attributed to the impact of that revenue loss on human rights instead of only focusing on activities contributing towards it. For example, money transfers across jurisdictions for the purpose of diversifying portfolio shares or money transfers like remittances that are informal in nature do not come under the purview of ‘illicit’ flows. However, IFFs stemming from unscrupulous and abusive tax dodging and minimization strategies used by MNCs do. These practices are not necessarily illegal but have adverse socio-economic implications. In other words, financial outflows that slip through legal loopholes defeat the legislative intent of the law but do not violate the law itself. National regulatory bodies may determine and scrutinize the legality of similar behaviour on a case to case basis; however, the resulting high costs discourage state authorities from being able to pursue them.

¹ Epstein, G. (2007). Capital flight and capital controls in developing countries. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Since, tax departments are severely under-resourced and under-funded both in low income countries and emerging economies, there is little chance of monitoring dubious activities or recovering stolen public assets and funds.

Global financial opacity systematically provides multiple safe channels for IFFs to remain outside the scrutiny of national laws and public eyes, regardless of the nature of IFFs. Being deeply intertwined with global financial flows, it is in the ability of an illicit financial outflow to manifest itself into licit financial circles. This may occur in the form of development aid² or foreign direct investment (FDI), both licit in nature. For example, offshore financial centres (OFCs; commonly known as tax havens) are used to round trip illicit funds that have escaped from national authorities to the country of origin as FDI. Normally FDIs entering a country are not taxed and therefore, are an effective method of dodging taxes. Most MNCs route a third of their FDI through OFCs.

Remaining out of reach of any institutional scrutiny is a central characteristic of IFFs. The shift in the international understanding from capital flight to illicit financial flows highlights the active role of secrecy jurisdictions in facilitating IFFs through anonymous structures and complicated arrangements³.

1.1 Enablers, Components, Methods & Practices

Amoral intentions on the part of enablers are both the cause and consequence of illicit financial flows.

✚ Informal or underground banking channels: Most developing, low income countries, conflict ridden or fragile states do not have proper banking systems and institutions in place and are heavily cash-strapped. As public trust in banking structures or the state itself is not very high, there is huge reliance on personal relationships, bonds and networks to transfer funds. Alternative private channels of banking exist in emerging economies like China too and are actively used for money laundering. These channels are widely used by criminals, corrupt and the general public to move large sums of funds both within and across borders. These laundering channels can range from primitive methods to utterly complex tools. *Hawala* or *Hundi* networks in South Asia too, navigate transfer of money through trustworthy intermediaries, similar to *Mulas* present in Latin American countries.

✚ Corporate vehicles and service providers: A secrecy jurisdiction (or commonly known as tax haven) provides multiple legal and financial services, arrangements and layers of anonymity in all forms to hide illicit finance that crosses border. These structures and

² Mainly tied aid implemented through contracts, companies to developing countries.

³ Herkenrath, M. (2014). Illicit Financial Flows and their Developmental Impacts: An Overview. *Revue internationale de politique de développement*, (5.3).

channels exist within countries for illicit outflows to occur. Secrecy caters to ensure both onshore and offshore financing by concealing the identity of the true owner of that legal entity (company, trust, foundation, limited liability partnership, co-operative society, association). High net-worth individuals (HNWIs), politically exposed persons (PEPs), dictators, oligarchs, art dealers, smugglers, corrupt, terrorists alike have been known to use 'shell companies'⁴ to mask their money, assets and operations from prying authorities. Any "entity" or HNWI looking to effectively hide this trail of money uses the counsel and assistance of a hub of experts and professionals like bankers, lawyers, notaries, chartered accountants, wealth managers, bookkeepers, auditors and brokers. Through revelations like the Lux leaks, financial institutions have also been found guilty of not following due diligence procedures and conducting proper background checks to solicit in tax avoidance deals at the behest of MNCs and lobbyists.

✚ Offshore wealth: The use of tax havens have corporatised concealing of private wealth from regulatory authorities, a person's own family or business associates or competitors. Estimates of undeclared global private wealth accumulated in tax havens ranges from 8-18 percent, amounting in trillions⁵. Additionally, the existence of trust laws have allowed a person to divert inheritance laws. Narrowing down the geographical origins of wealth continues to remain a challenge due to the dearth of data. The motivation behind declaring only a portion of wealth in some cases is the assumed security of assets offshore or fund management services provided in offshore financial centres.

✚ Crime related: Organised crime operates as a shadow economy through local power structures, underground money laundering and trans-border trade networks. These networks comprise of small brokers, public actors, politicians, informal money transfer channels that work in coherence with each other as a close-knit business. A 2011 report⁶ by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) found that drug trafficking constitutes the largest share of illicit funds originating from criminal activities, constituting 0.9 percent of the global GDP.

✚ Corruption: Practices like rent-seeking are normative in Petrolist or mineral-rich developing economies. Rent seeking refers to increasing one's share of wealth without contributing to an economic activity that generates value. These may include bribery in both

⁴ Shell companies are entities with no real economic operations, physical presence or employees but are used as tools for money laundering. They are also referred to as on-paper companies, front companies.

⁵ Alstadsæter A., Niels Johannesen and Gabriel Zucman (2017). Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? Macro Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality. Working Paper 23805. National Bureau of Economic Research. Available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w23805>

⁶ UNODC (2011). Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes

the public and private sector. The High Level Panel report on IFFs (2015) argues that the main purpose of corrupt activities is beyond only generating more IFFs. Money laundering helps corrupt politicians be in power without any accountability. The Azerbaijani Laundromat scandal is a perfect tale of high level corruption where money was laundered between 2012-2014 through shell companies registered in the United Kingdom involving EU politicians, Azeri kleptocrats and lobbyists under the guise of conducting independent and democratic elections in Azerbaijan. Anti-money laundering (AML) policies are primarily focused towards addressing IFFs that emerge from drug and human trafficking, terrorism, illicit weapon trade, theft of public funds etc.

✚ Trade related: Almost 80 percent of world trade occurs between MNCs and their subsidiaries or related companies in the global value chains⁷. A 2016 study by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) argued that trade misinvoicing of goods results in “some countries losing 67 percent of the value of their exports”.⁸ A discrepancy reported as over or under-pricing of goods and services in trade receipts of exports and imports is called trade misinvoicing. Double invoicing allows companies to produce two different invoices of goods at different sides of the border in same supply chain. Many developing countries have trade-related tariffs, quotas, rules concerning foreign ownership. IFFs can be motivated by evading such rules by falsifying import-export invoices by their price, quantity or quality.

✚ Tax evasion: Capital regulation allows countries to keep control on any illegitimate activities. Illicit capital flows motivated from activities like tax evasion⁹ could occur from forged tax returns, manipulation of rents by corrupt bureaucrats or public officials (rent scraping) where a share of the profit may go to filling their pockets. Without institutionalised watchdogs, tax evasion contributes to a large share of the shadow economy and lowers compliance encouraging wilful dodging of taxes. False reporting on income or profits is common in this scenario.

✚ Tax minimisation and avoidance strategies: While tax evasion is clearly illegal, tax avoidance occurs through the gaps in the legal laws, lapses in regulation and through opaque structures and arrangements.

- Tax incentive abuse: Governments relying solely upon their discretion, offer covert deals, discussed behind closed doors, as various exemptions or breaks on taxes to

7 UNCTAD (2013). World Investment Report: Global Value Chains: Investment And Trade For Development

⁸ Ndikumana, L. (2016). Trade Misinvoicing in Primary Commodities in Developing Countries: The cases of Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. Geneva: UNCTAD

⁹ Tax evasion can also be included under the wider definition of corruption.

investors and big businesses. These deals are in particular susceptible to corruption and often a direct result of intense corporate lobbying. As a result, countries end up limiting their sovereign abilities to tax and enter an intense race to the bottom with countries employing similar tactics. Slashed corporate income tax (CIT) rates not only harm local enterprises but categorically give rise to artificial tax competition.

- Abusive transfer pricing: Transfer price is the cost of a transaction between two related parties. Cross-border intra-trade between MNCs and related parties are calculated at an arm's length principle. Ideally, market forces would determine the transaction between two independent entities. However, subsidiary or associated companies at trade may manipulate this price to dodge their tax liabilities from state authorities. For example, each country categorises commodities differently and may extend tariff exemptions on certain products. A loophole, MNCs exploit through intra-firm trade to misprice commodities exempted from taxes in the destination country¹⁰. It has been found that related party prices are much lower than the market price calculated at arm's length. Countries with weak tax structures and monitoring mechanisms in place are the most affected by such practices.
- Intra-corporate borrowing: Also known as intra-corporate loans, under this practice, the subsidiary based out of higher tax jurisdiction can borrow from the subsidiary based out of the lower taxed jurisdiction (or tax haven) and thus claim maximum tax deductions on interest payments on the loan in the higher taxed jurisdiction.
- Tax or corporate inversion: A corporation may move their legal ownership to a tax haven while retaining their economic operations in the high tax country. This practice of corporate inversion allows companies to artificially move their profits accordingly and reduces the tax collection in the jurisdiction with taxes.
- Tax Treaty Abuse: Tax or investment treaties are international agreements between governments that detail a division of taxing rights to avoid double taxation of corporate incomes (dividends, capital gains or interest gains) earned in the 'source' country¹¹. They have come under scrutiny by international institutions for their misuse by MNCs. MNCs plan their investments through countries with whom their 'domicile' country¹² has bilateral investment and taxation agreements with. A legal person may seek treaty benefits not attributed to them directly from a third country on income generated in another country. Consequently, as economic value is created in developing countries,

¹⁰ Bernard *et al* (2006;2008)

¹¹ Source country is the place of operations where the actual economic value is created.

¹² Country where the MNC is headquartered at or with permanent establishment, also known as residence countries.

they end up losing control of their ability to tax. Ultimately, MNCs evaluate and identify the terms of these treaties and domestic legislations which offer better incentives for their investments and route them to the source country through tax havens in order to avoid paying tax¹³. Owing to the tax treaty between India-Mauritius, from April 2000 to March 2011, inflows from Mauritius alone constituted almost 41.50 percent of the entire foreign direct investment to India¹⁴. MNCs are known to influence the effectiveness of the treaty in their favour using political ties.

¹³ Action Aid (2015). *Levelling Up: Ensuring a Fairer Share of Corporate Tax for Developing Countries*.

¹⁴ Ministry of Finance (2012), 'The White Paper on Black Money', Central Board of Direct Taxes. Pp 1-96

2. How Do International Institutions View Illicit Financial Flows?

Global institutions have continued to struggle to come up with a comprehensive definition and set of actions to tackle illicit financial flows. Transitioning from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015, the United Nations (UN) came out with 17 global goals with a range of 169 distributed targets as SDGs 2030 primarily encompassing global issues and financing needs of countries in achieving these goals. After months of negotiations, the year 2015 also saw countries unequivocally support the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD). The target 16.4 in Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) limits the definition of the term illicit financial flows generated from organised crime related activities and focuses on “*reducing illicit financial and arm flows and retrieving stolen assets*”. As IFFs fall under the tier 3 category, there is no set definition, design or identifiers for national governments to work on. There is a real gap in the conceptual, contextual and terminological understanding of IFFs. While, the AAAA also commits to “*substantially reduce illicit financial flows by 2030, with a view to eventually eliminating them, including by combating tax evasion and corruption through strengthened national regulation and increased international cooperation. (...) and reduce opportunities for tax avoidance*”¹⁵, it does not constitute a clear definition.

High-level Mbeki Panel report on ‘Illicit Financial Flows from Africa’ (2015)

“Money that is illegally earned transferred or utilized. These funds typically originate from three sources: commercial tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and abusive transfer pricing; criminal activities, including the drug trade, human trafficking, illegal arms dealing, and smuggling of contraband; and bribery and theft by corrupt government officials.”

The report adds:

“(...) the term “illicit” is a fair description of activities that, while not strictly illegal in all cases, go against established rules and norms, including avoiding legal obligations to pay tax. Our purpose in doing so was to establish the nature of such outflows, given the harm that they cause to African economies.”

European Parliament (2015)

“ (...) all unrecorded private financial outflows involving capital that is illegally earned, transferred or utilized”, and then goes on to say that “ (...) typically originate from tax evasion

¹⁵ Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015). Available here: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf (paragraph 23)

and avoidance activities, such as abusive transfer pricing, against the principle that taxes should be paid where profits have been generated.”

Human Rights Council (2016)

“(…) a large number of phenomena classified as illicit financial flows, including illegal tax evasion; tax avoidance by transnational corporations; bribery, corruption and concomitant asset recovery; and other criminal activities.”

Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC) (2016)

“Son movimientos de un país a otro de dinero que ha sido ganado, transferido o utilizado de manera ilegal. En general se originan en:

- actividades comerciales,*
- en actividades delictivas y en la corrupción.”*

(Translated: Illicit financial flows are the movements of money from one country to another gained, transferred or used illegally. In general they originate in:

- Commercial activities,
- Criminal activities and in corruption.)

‘Financing for Development: Progress and Prospects’, Report of the Inter-Action Task Force on Financing for Development (2017)

“IFFs are often defined as constituting money that is illegally earned, transferred or used and that crosses borders. (...) there are generally three categories of IFFs, although these are not mutually exclusive or comprehensive: IFFs originating from transnational criminal activity; corruption-related IFFs; and tax-related IFFs.”

UN Second Committee Resolution on Illicit Financial Flows (2017)

“(…) the impact of illicit financial flows, in particular [to] those caused by tax evasion and corruption, on the economic, social and political stability and development of societies.”

World Bank (2017)

“(…) refers to the cross-border movement of capital associated with illegal activity or more explicitly, money that is illegally earned, transferred or used that crosses borders. This falls into three main areas:

The acts themselves are illegal (e.g. corruption, tax evasion); or

The funds are the results of illegal acts (e.g. smuggling and trafficking in minerals, wildlife, drugs, and people); or

The funds are used for illegal purposes (e.g., financing of organized crime).¹⁶”

¹⁶ World Bank (2017). Illicit Financial Flows. Available at:
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/illicit-financial-flows-iffs>

3. How Do Illicit Financial Flows Undermine Justice in Developing Countries?

Developing countries face a global infrastructure deficit of \$3-\$5 trillion annually¹⁷. To fulfil the 2030 goals for lower income and lower-middle income countries alone, the UN Sustainable Development Network estimates a revenue figure of at least \$1.4 trillion annually. Bilateral aid to the poorest countries declined in 2016, despite calls to fulfil Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments by developed countries in both the SDG and AAAA framework. The financial gap for developing countries is nearly two-thirds of the total ODA flows to developing countries (UNCTAD, 2015). There is a cost attached to eradicating poverty and resolving inequality. IFFs understandably contribute to this financial gap and prevent the progressive realisation of rights through mobilisation of domestic resources. As foreign aid flows to developing countries deteriorate, there is a resounding realisation on financing development through domestic resource mobilisation. Chowla and Falcao (2016) argue that IFFs leave out the national activities generating illicit funds and are thus, a subset to the gargantuan problem of illicit finance.

Since IFFs are essentially hidden, it is almost impossible to calculate and estimate the potential direct and indirect spill-over effects with accuracy. Broadly, the definition of IFFs can be categorised into the moral and legal aspect. Additionally, estimating the size of IFFs would require a wide range of activities to be included as issues. For developing countries these activities are regionally and nationally influenced. Even with IFF estimates it is hard to illustrate its impact on human rights tied in a single thread. While there have been estimates around large scale illicit outflows, there have also been disaggregated estimates on the basis of source, activity, the method employed to facilitate IFFs and the conduit used for transferring funds illegally from one jurisdiction to another. There have also been studies estimating overall i.e. global, regional, national figures for IFFs. Economist Gabriel Zucman (2013; 2015) uses ownership to determine the asset share owned by foreign nationals in tax havens, expanding this data by including central bank reserves and bilateral investments between countries. According to this method, the offshore wealth was estimated at \$7.6 trillion in 2015. Without taking tax avoidance, cash-based money laundering and misinvoicing on services into account, Global Financial Integrity offers a range of \$620-970 billion as the total illicit outflows figures in the year 2014 from developing countries. The actual figures may well be over this.

¹⁷ Inter-Agency Action Task Force (2017). Financing for Development: Progress and Prospects

One-third of the global revenue losses related to tax avoidance occur from developing countries (Cobham & Janský, 2017), close to \$100 billion annually¹⁸. Exemptions on taxes are provided mainly to drive FDI in the country with the promise of increased local job growth. Governments also open Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Free Trade Zones (FTZs) to corporates offering them lucrative tax holidays. Not only does this lead to misuse but there is also little evidence to support that incentives are able to drive FDI. A least developed country like Bangladesh offers 15 years of tax holidays to coal-based power generation companies and nearly 5-7 years of tax holidays to companies established in ‘export processing zones’, a form of SEZs. In Bangladesh, for example, SEZs also allow varied exemptions on stamp duty levied for land registration, value added tax for services consumed in the zone and custom duty imposed on exports. An unintended consequence of tax incentives are the ‘leakages’ of goods destined for exports that have not paid tariffs. Taking advantage of such ambiguities, companies manipulate trade receipts to avoid paying import tariffs. ECLAC in their Economic Survey of 2015 concluded that trade misinvoicing in fact represented 1.8 percent of their regional GDP.

In comparison to a southern¹⁹ country, a rich developed country has more leeway over negotiating bilateral agreements on trade and investment. Kenya was forced to enter in an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU in late 2014 after EU introduced tariffs on Kenyan flower imports. To protect its local businesses, Kenya opened 80 percent of its market to EU imports. The Economic Commission of Africa in a report argues that such deals will expose local industries to international competition and “lead to uneven trade gains for Africa”²⁰. As mentioned earlier, these agreements particularly factor the allocation of taxing rights. In another example, Bangladesh loses up to \$85 million annually due to unfair and exploitative treaties that prevent it from taxing accrued dividend incomes²¹. An Australian mining firm dodged taxes in Malawi for six years using loopholes and structures that deprived the country of \$43 million in revenue²². Tax-related IFFs directly or indirectly undermine a country’s ability to raise and effectively mobilise domestic revenue. The grey-zone of abusive practices may or may not be classified as illegal as they are often not investigated, resulting in a legal silence around these practices, as they are not statutorily outlawed.

Following trade liberalisation in developing countries, there is a greater possibility among developing countries to levy indirect taxes on consumption to keep up with falling revenue collections. Indirect taxes on consumption (like service taxes, value added taxes etc.) essentially

¹⁸ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2015). The World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance

¹⁹ Global South represents countries in the developing regions of Latin America, Africa and Asia that share a colonial and imperial past. Southern countries refer to countries belonging to the Global South.


²⁰ UN Economic Commission for Africa (2015). Industrialising through Trade: Economic Report on Africa.

²¹ Action Aid (2016). Mistreated: Tax Treaties.

²² Action Aid (2015). An Extractive Affair.

impact the poor and the vulnerable disproportionately. Such taxes inadvertently push the burden of taxes on the poor, women and other marginalised sections of the society who primarily depend on government sponsored services. Further, owing to a sizable informal sector, developing countries have poor labour standards. Jobs generated in SEZs pay subsistence wages and have been accused of causing grave environmental violations.

IFFs restrict public investment in social sectors like education, health, sanitation, welfare schemes. The percentage of people living on less than \$1.25 per day up to 2015 was the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, closely followed by South Asia and South-East Asia. After Swiss leaks, it was revealed that India lost between \$492 million-\$1.2 billion in revenue through just one branch of Swiss bank. The leaks showcased a giant tax evasion scheme orchestrated by the British bank HSBC through its subsidiary based out of Switzerland. The lost revenue made up to 6 percent of the social sector budget for the financial year 2016-17. This sum equalled to nearly 44 percent of spending allocated to women’s rights²³.




Source: Financial Transparency Coalition and Christian Aid (2015). Swiss Leaks Reviewed.

Patriarchal structures leave women and other ostracised genders vulnerable to exploitation and violence. Women and the marginalised contribute greatly as disguised labourers, working in

²³ Center for Economic and Social Rights *et al* (2016). Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 65th Session, November 2016. Swiss Responsibility for the Extraterritorial Impacts of Tax Abuse on Women’s Rights. Available at: http://www.cesr.org/sites/default/files/switzerland_cedaw_submission_2nov2016.pdf

hazardous conditions with abominable wages. According to a 2017 report by the International Labour Organisation and Walk Free Foundation, women and girls constitute to nearly 71 percent out of the 21 million victims of global human trafficking. There is no doubt those global profits accrued from illegal activities of human exploitation, arms trade, conflict and organised crime are well-integrated into the licit economic circles. Refugees escaping conflict are easy targets for traffickers as has been evident from the current crisis of the Libyan slave trade and the genocide of Rohingyas in Myanmar.



Source: *Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage by International Labour Organisation and Walk Free Foundation (2017)*

IFFs pose a genuine threat to geo-political security and may fuel conflict. Small arms and light weapons trafficking alone generate an industry of \$1.7-3.5 billion annually²⁴. Europol, the law enforcement agency of the European Union, was able to link nearly 3,500 suspected criminals including terrorists after the Panama leaks for sheltering their illicit money²⁵. Like a vicious cyclical loop, any generation of IFFs only leads to its further generation. IFFs harp on existing structural inequalities to permeate and intensify the economic divide in a society. Not only are illicit outflows damaging to the very foundation and ethos of justice, they also adversely affect the rule of law of a country.

²⁴ May C. (2017). Transnational Crime and Terrorist Financing. Global Financial Integrity

²⁵ Pegg, D. (2016). *Panama Papers: Europol links 3,500 names to suspected criminals*. The Guardian. [online] Accessed on 31 Aug. 2017 at: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/dec/01/panama-papers-europol-links-3500-names-to-suspected-criminals>

3.1 The Role of State and Institutions in the Global South

The quality of institutions and structures can be traced to that country's colonial past²⁶. Colonies exploited for their extractive wealth in fact are net creditors of IFFs to the world. It is no co-incidence that these colonies have also inherited poor quality institutions and surface low on socio-economic development indicators with high inequality levels. For example, a Petrolist developing state is less likely to adhere to democratic standards if the oil prices are up²⁷. Progressive realisation of development through domestic mobilisation of resources in Southern countries provides an opportunity to reverse the colonial legacy of institutions. While taxation remains a sovereign issue, tax base erosion of Southern countries by IFFs hinders this redistribution process. It is more likely that corporate taxes form a greater share in a developing country's direct tax base. The extent of illicit financial outflows is also significant to the status of the prevailing tax system and political freedoms accorded to the citizens of that country. As state and institutions have progressed, so have the activities contributing to illicit finance. The moral role of states and institutions in fulfilling development justice to restore public faith is not without robust regulation that promotes transparency and upholds the autonomy of oversight institutions.

3.2 The Hegemony of Secretive Jurisdictions: Where Does the Money End Up?

Tax havens have existed from before World War I. The term *haven* refers to a place of refuge and a tax haven would be such a place providing solace from taxes. In other languages a mistranslation of the English term 'haven' as 'heaven' has led them to be called 'fiscal paradises' (French, Spanish, Portuguese), while most languages have translated the term literally from English showing its origins in the post-colonial era in the British offshore dominions. It is however, unfair to use the term tax haven or much worse a 'fiscal paradise' to illustrate the pervasive impact these jurisdictions have had on human rights. Tax havens have also been referred to low tax jurisdictions which is significantly better at capturing a central function of preferential tax regimes i.e. they have low taxes. While this term is certainly an improvement, it does not encapsulate those jurisdictions that offer furtive services and anonymity to tax dodgers, the wealthy and the corrupt. The etymological understanding of tax haven has evolved to *secrecy jurisdictions*. It best describes the covert nature of the offshore industry including hubs of onshore secrecy. Most Latin American countries have now adopted using terms like 'preferential fiscal regimes' or 'low tax jurisdictions', which rightly highlight the two aspects of tax haven.

²⁶ Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); Easterly and Levine (2002)

²⁷ Friedman, T. (2009). The First Law of Petropolitics. *Foreign Policy*. [online] Accessed on 4 Nov. 2017 at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/16/the-first-law-of-petropolitics/>

If one notes, the legacy of such jurisdictions came out of the disturbing legacy of colonialism and imperialism. A large part of the offshore economy operates on investments made anonymously in London, New York, the State of Delaware, Amsterdam (a legacy of Dutch East India Company), Frankfurt and others, which also happen to be influential international financial centres. A 2015 investigation into property investments across London, since 2008, were revealed to be worth of at least £100 billion bought through unknown overseas based structures²⁸. By 2015, more than \$12 trillion²⁹ was siphoned out of emerging economies and developing countries as offshore finance. A recent study published by Garcia-Bernado *et al* (2017) disputes the traditional idea of small islands countries (SICs) being largely identified as tax havens. The study further argues that SIC jurisdictions are in fact used as conduit routes for illicit capital outflows only to finally end up in financial centres based in rich and developed countries. This is particularly the case for three UK overseas territories of Caribbean states, such as Cayman Islands, Bermuda and British Virgin Islands, that are booking centres for illicit financial flows that are ordered and negotiated in major financial centres such as London and New York and Hong Kong as exposed by the links to offshore law firms in Paradise Papers and Panama Papers. To put this in perspective, the capital lost from developing countries is likely to end up and be retained in rich and developed countries. This is precisely why the geographical locations of such jurisdictions matter. While this holds true, offshore developments have shown a worrying shift to parking wealth in Asian international financial centres like Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan³⁰. Hong Kong surpassed Singapore as a preferred destination for cross-border wealth management in 2015. Newer international free trade zones like Horgos³¹ on the China-Kazakhstan border, launched as a part of the Silk Road Initiative, are increasingly being used for its perverse tax breaks. To add more, Asia is also notably the fastest growing region contributing to IFFs. Investigations like the Paradise Papers, Panama Papers and Swiss leaks show how the offshore industry consciously works against the redistributive needs of countries.

²⁸ Crerar, P. and Prynne, J. (2015). Revealed: How foreign buyers have bought £100bn of London property in six years. *Evening Standard*. [online] Available at:

<https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/revealed-how-foreign-buyers-have-bought-100bn-of-london-property-in-six-years-a3095936.html>

²⁹ Stewart H. (2016). Offshore finance: more than \$12tn siphoned out of emerging countries. [online] the Guardian. Accessed on 15 Nov. 2017 at:

<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/08/offshore-finance-emerging-countries-russia-david-cameron-summit>

³⁰ Hong Kong is ranked 2nd and Singapore the 4th on the Financial Secrecy Index (2015). More info here: <http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2015-results>

³¹ Wong, S. and Gordeyeva, M. (2017). Silk Road hub or tax haven? China's new border trade zone may be less than it seems. *Reuters*. [online] Accessed on 10 Jan. 2018 available at:

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-horgos/silk-road-hub-or-tax-haven-chinas-new-border-trade-zone-may-be-less-than-it-seems-idUSKBN18V15Z>

4. Restoring Justice: Putting an End to Illicit Financial Flows

The problem of illicit financial flows poses as the greatest development challenge in present times. It is incumbent upon national governments to protect their fiscal space and reprioritise public spending. The global financial crisis of 2007-8 exposed the rampant abuse of power and unregulated behaviour exercised by banks and corporations. Regardless of the widespread public outcry, global offshore wealth has increased by 54 percent since 2007 (Zucman, 2015). Transparency and legislative measures backed with resource mobilisation plans can restore public faith and integrity back in state institutions.

The lack of terminological clarity on IFFs deters healthy policy making. Even civil society groups have divided positions on IFFs and fail to agree as to what constitutes an IFF. Representing the moral character of IFFs in figures is a genuine challenge faced by governments, regulatory bodies and advocacy groups. Addressing only loopholes leading to criminal financing is inadequate because the network of global financial secrecy caters to all types of illicit financial outflows. There is an urgent need for developing countries and international institutions to take cognizance of the problem of IFFs and come up with a mutually agreed upon work plan in order to tackle them. International cooperation on tackling illicit financial flows and ensuring tax justice is at the core of upholding social, economic and political rights.

Tax and judicial investigations are also made difficult by the lack of ultimate beneficial owners³², accounting, and other information to enable authorities to investigate IFFs. A public registry of ultimate beneficial owners of all legal entities including asset ownership and public country by country reporting³³ of financial information by MNCs are imperative measures in the fight against financial secrecy and tax dodging practices. The criteria set for identifying a beneficial owner should be at 5 percent or lower, as a higher threshold is susceptible to abuse. Multiple faux representatives can be appointed to tamper with the extent of economic control a BO has over an entity and thus, circumvent reporting commitments of identifying a BO. Developing countries like Afghanistan, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Indonesia and Ukraine have committed to come up with public beneficial ownership registeries. Increasing the capacity of developing country authorities to both investigate and gain access to information on foreign-owned and operated entities would significantly assist tackling IFFs of all types. The public account of financial information should also report royalties, exemptions on taxes received by MNCs. Any tax handout to corporates must be disclosed publically and bound in time, purpose and scope by law. Reforms in national tax policymaking should aim at reducing inequality

³² An ultimate beneficial owner(s) is the human owner of an entity who exercises direct or indirect economic control over that entity.

³³ Public financial reporting of profits (or losses), revenue, taxes paid, number of employees etc. on a country-by-country basis by all MNCs.

through progressive taxes like inheritance taxes and wealth taxes accompanied with gender-responsive budgetting.

Tax cooperation is also crucial to prevent arm-twisting of developing countries into signing agreements that work against them. One such endeavour in this direction was the Mbeki Panel Report in 2015 combined with regional advocacy listed a three-way process to curbing IFFs plaguing Africa as a continent. ECLAC has launched similar initiatives to build national ownership and awareness on these issues. Integrating the development justice agenda with a movement on South-South tax cooperation can pave its way for solutions mainly affecting developing countries. This space could support asset recovery efforts, enable exchange of transfer of expertise and best practices, end to race to bottom practices, legal assistance, better impact driven literature and adoption of progressive social policies.

The rich, developed OECD³⁴ and G20 countries are at the centre influencing and forming the current rules on international finance. In this regard, civil society groups and many G77 countries have extended their support to a global tax body under the aegis of United Nations, as an equal and democratic platform to debate and inform policies on taxation that affect all countries and not just a few.

³⁴ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Bibliography

Boyce, J. (2015). *Capital Flight from Africa: What is to be Done?*

Chowla, P. and Falcao, T. (2016). *Illicit Financial Flows: Concepts and Scope*. FfDO Working Paper Series. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Illicit-financial-flows-conceptual-paper_FfDO-working-paper.pdf

Christian Aid (2016). Benefits for whom? Tax incentives in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Cobham, A. & Janský, P. (2017) Global distribution of revenue loss from tax avoidance: Re-estimation and country results. WIDER Working Paper 2017/55. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER

Crivelli, E., de Mooij, R. and Keen, M. (2016). Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries. *FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis*, 72(3), pp.268-301.

Contractor, Farok J. (2016) *Tax avoidance by multinational companies: methods, policies, and ethics*. Rutgers Business Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 27–43. Available at: http://documents.aib.msu.edu/publications/insights/v16n2/v16n2_Article3.pdf

Global Financial Integrity (2017). Illicit Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries: 2005-2014.

Grondona, V., Ponte, N. and ENRIQUEZ, C. (2016). *Illicit Financial Flows Undermining Gender Justice*. Friedrich-EbertStiftung (FES). [online] Available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/12984.pdf>

International Labour Office (2017). *Global estimates of modern slavery: Forced labour and forced marriage*. Geneva: ISBN 978-92-2-331039-4 [web]. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--dgreports/--dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf

Johannesen N. and Jukka Pirttilä (2016). *Capital flight and Development: An Overview of Concepts, Methods and Data Sources*. WIDER Working Paper: 2016/95. UNU-WIDER. [online] Available at: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2016-95.pdf>

United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa (2015). Illicit financial flows: Report of the High Level Panel on illicit financial flows from Africa.